Constructive memory. Rethinking memory to redefine personal identity.
15/07/2019 - 14/07/2020
Abstract
The question of the relations between memory and personal identity is a key question in the history of philosophy, but also is at the confluent of several research fields, such as psychology, neuroscience and philosophy of mind. My work inherits from a philosophical tradition in which self continuity is grounded in memory (Locke, 1694; Parfit, 1984). Nevertheless, I argue that the concept of memory itself needs to be rethought to endorse this function, and in particular has to be consistent with recent empirical findings on episodic memory. The analysis of phenomena like non-pathological false recognition and memory distortions (Schacter, Guerin, St Jacques, 2011), the consequences of episodic amnesia on the ability to think about one's future (Tulving, 1985) compel us to redefine both the mechanisms and the functions of episodic memory and to consider its relevance for the definition of the self from a different perspective. In particular, according to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter and Addis, 2007) one of the functions of episodic memory is to allow individuals to recombine elements of their past experiences in order to prepare their own future. Accordingly, we have to rethink the significance of episodic memory for the personal self, as it is not only the instrument of self-recognition but the means to a different end, the construction of a self that envisions its future.
Researcher(s)
- Promoter: Nanay Bence
- Fellow: Gérardin-Laverge Loraine
Research team(s)
Project type(s)
- Research Project
Disentangling Consciousness and Attention: Using a Multilevel Analysis of Cognitive Control to Account for Mental Action.
01/10/2016 - 30/09/2020
Abstract
This project investigates the relation between consciousness and attention, a relation which needs to be specified in order to make progress on the problem of consciousness. The central questions are whether there can be consciousness without attention and whether there can be attention without consciousness. Progress on both questions is stagnating, because they are currently posed as if attention were a single phenomenon. This is not the case, as research on attention shows. The problem is that there's currently no satisfying taxonomy of the different attention types, which makes it very difficult for consciousness researchers to translate and integrate findings from the attention literature into their theorizing. The aim is to fill this lacuna, by developing such a taxonomy. This will lead to a reformulation of both questions according to the identified attention types. These new questions will then be reassessed on the basis of relevant empirical findings. The result will be a more fine-grained account of the relation between both concepts, which will undoubtedly fuel subsequent theorizing and experimentation in the field of consciousness. My results will impact two related philosophical problems, which will also be addressed: the first concerns the 'metaphysics' of attention or finding its essential features. The other is to assess whether attention can provide counterexamples to representationalism, which states that the character of experience is determined by its content.
Researcher(s)
- Promoter: Nanay Bence
- Fellow: Alzetta Nicolas
Research team(s)
Project type(s)
- Research Project