Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Past projects

Find below an exhaustive list of the research projects carried out at the CPP, listed per year of completion.

Predictive Sensorimotor Theory: An Investigation Into Non-representationalist Solutions.

01/10/2019 - 30/09/2021

Abstract

The theoretical environment in the philosophy of the cognitive sciences is diffuse. In explaining conscious perceptual experience we uphold a wide variety of different theories. Two popular promising theories about experience are predictive processing (PP) and sensorimotor theory (SMT). It seems that the respective theories have what the other lacks. Where PP's cerebral focus feels too narrow, SMT's bodily focus can seem to play down the importance of the neural underpinnings of experience. Despite this promising fit, SMT rejects the representations at work in PP, making them incompatible. In this research I intend to fuse PP and SMT, forming a hybrid theory. The challenge is to make the theory internally coherent. The field however is shrouded in vague terminology, and the aforementioned incompatibility may be as well. The concept 'representation' is famous for being indeterminate, and the first stage will involve clarification of terminology, as to sharpen the exact points of conflict. In stage 2, I intend to resolve this conflict, and open up the path for hybridity. This will be done by explaining PP's representational functions in terms of non-representational sensorimotor activity. In stage 3, I will assess the extent to which this hybrid theory is internally coherent without loss of explanatory reach or power. Or, if this project fails, I will analyze where the conflict is insurmountable, as to give a clear idea of how to proceed in explaining consciousness.

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  • Research Project

The Art of the Impossible: A Philosophical Study of Theatrical Magic (PhiloMagic).

01/08/2019 - 31/07/2021

Abstract

PhiloMagic is an interdisciplinary project in philosophical aesthetics in the analytic tradition. It focuses primarily on the art of theatrical magic (think David Copperfield, not Harry Potter), which the American Society for Aesthetics recognizes as a "neglected art." PhiloMagic builds on my prize-winning essay, "The Experience of Magic," which is the first systematic philosophical treatment of theatrical magic in the analytic—or, to my knowledge, any—tradition. For my fellowship, I will spend 24 months at the Centre for Philosophical Psychology at the University of Antwerp under the supervision of Professor Bence Nanay. While in Antwerp, my main objectives are to complete a book manuscript (entitled The Art of the Impossible), write and submit for publication three accompanying scholarly articles, and organize a series of four study groups (each culminating in a public lecture) as well as an international workshop in the philosophy and psychology of magic.

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  • Research Project

International Network for Sensory Research.

01/01/2019 - 31/12/2021

Abstract

Psychologists, philosophers and cognitive scientists have assumed until very recently that we can study the senses – vision, audition, olfaction – independently from one another. The assumption was that we can study various aspects of, say, vision, without paying much attention to the other sense modalities. But recent empirical evidence shows that this has been a mistake: our perceptual processes are normally multimodal – different sense modalities influence each other in various ways. The aim of the International Network for Sensory Research is to trace the theoretical, empirical and methodological consequences of these findings. The new evidence about the multimodality of perception radically changes the lay of the land in a number of classic and contemporary debates about perception and about the mind in general. And sometimes it even changes the way we should ask questions about perception.

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  • Research Project

Inter-level causality in the life sciences.

01/10/2018 - 30/09/2021

Abstract

For most people, it will be uncontroversial that causal relations can exist between mechanisms and their parts: a decrease in serotonin levels can cause depression, and a bust spark plug causes engine failure. Yet in the philosophy of science, many believe that these inter-level relations are in fact only causal because they are hybrid: they contain both a causal, horizontal part, and a noncausal vertical part. Although most philosophers agree on this, they disagree about how to characterize the non-causal, vertical relation. Several attempts have been made, including constitution and mutual manipulability, but all these attempts face problems of their own. Consequently, the debate has becomoe mired by all kinds of difficulties. The present project seeks to remedy this situation by rejecting the interdict on inter-level causality. If analyized properly, many scientific studies and experiments aim at uncovering inter-level causal relation. Thus, it seems that in this case, philosphers have it wrong. The project tries to dispell the arguments used to justify the interdict, and show why they were so convincing in the first place.

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  • Research Project

Enactive Approach to Pretending.

01/10/2018 - 30/09/2021

Abstract

This research aims to explore the potential of Enactivism for explaining pretending. Pretending is part of a common development of children, and belongs to our cultural repertoire. Yet, pretending is still not well understood. Many are inclined to speak of pretending as representing 'x as y'. This is known as Cognitivism. It says that pretending requires representing absence, knowledge of what is real and not real, and knowledge of norms. To explain these features of pretending, Cognitivism relies mainly on the workings of internal mental architectures. These explanations do not capture well the interactive and social nature of pretending. In my proposal, I will investigate how an Enactivist approach explains pretending while avoiding the problems of Cognitivists. Enactivism includes interaction in its explanation of cognition, and often relies on dynamical explanations of cognition that stress the interplay between the brain, the body and the (social) environment. It proposes that knowledge of social norms is developed in pretend play, not assumed. Enactivism has only begun to be applied to basic forms of pretend playing with objects, but more needs to be said to account for absences or keeping track of fiction. This proposal will extend the earlier work, looking at development of role play and imaginary play, and aims to show that Enactivist account of complex pretending is possible. This research is useful for therapeutic practice that makes use of pretend play.

Researcher(s)

Research team(s)

Project type(s)

  • Research Project