Research Erik Myin

Abstract

Within theoretical neuroscience, many have by now embraced the view of the brain as a prediction machine which updates its predictions in light of incoming information. Yet, these 'Predictive Processing' theories (PP) face big conceptual challenges. As I've shown previously, by relying on semantic notions like information, representation, prediction, hypothesis-testing etc., they resist integration within the larger causal-mechanistic framework of which they claim to be a part. The twofold problem is, first, how to make naturalistic sense of semantic content or meaning at the level of individual neurons or neural populations and, second, how the assumed semantic content is supposed to be causally efficacious. Yet, if we can't understand the neuroscientific data in terms of upstream information, downstream prediction and resulting prediction errors, how, then, should the neuroscientist interpret the bidirectional neural activity? Via 3 complementary research objectives (RO1-03), this project is aimed at providing an alternative explanation for the neuroscientific data which is traditionally framed in terms of information processing and, more recently, information prediction. For RO1, the pivotal move will be to substitute the problematic notion of prediction with an empirically underpinned biological notion of anticipation that does not involve semantic content, and which does fit within the boundaries of the causal-mechanistic framework. With RO2, this notion of anticipation-without-prediction will be applied to the neuroscientific findings the PP theorist explains in terms of prediction. RO3 will be dedicated to further study anticipation-without-prediction at the microbiological level via lab experiment. Overall, the project aims to present an alternative to the computationalist view of the brain, which identifies neural activity with information processing. In this sense, the project has paradigm-shifting potential

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Zahnoun Farid

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The project aims to study how social, material, technological, and contextual factors are coordinated and reconfigured over time by the groups and individuals engaging in skilled practices, in particular scientific and interdisciplinary practices. Specifically, the project will focus on the practices of REPAIRS ETN. As a large interdisciplinary consortium, the REPAIRS ETN brings together different disciplines, composed of individuals responding to different patterns of socio-material practices and norms, with the common goal of advancing rehabilitation practices through the system perspective. Achieving this shared goal means that individuals will learn how to participate in and coordinate several different practices and change their criteria for success together as these practices get coordinated over time. Understanding how norms and values emerge from coordinated activities is crucial to appreciating the scope of the system perspective guiding the ETN. Through ethnography and observations of the different practices of scientists and experimenters this project seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of how normative coordination is made through the activities of skilled individuals, and groups, but in particular to understand the role of materials, technologies, and the environment in shaping and enabling this coordination over time.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Di Rienzo Giulia

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

Predictive Processing (PP) is an increasingly popular neurocomputational framework which is seemingly able to explain every facet of the mind. Importantly, PP is closely aligned to, and in fact vindicates, key insights coming from non-representational, ecological and enactive, approaches to cognition. Yet non-representational approaches are commonly thought of as structurally incapable of accounting for many aspects of mentality. So, how can PP account for every fact of the mind while being closely aligned to such approaches? My project elaborates a two-pronged strategy to answer this question. On the one hand, I will supplement the PP framework with conceptual and empirical resources coming from extended and distributed approaches to cognition. In this way, I will show how the cognitive engines described by PP can account for the rich panoply of our mental lives while remaining non-representational in the relevant way. On the other hand, I will argue that any explanatory need for inner representations is due to a cognitive illusion. This illusion, I will show, is the fruit of the unwarranted application to psychology and neuroscience of the (non-scientific) interpretative strategies we use to understand and interact with other human agents.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Facchin Marco

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

Virtual Reality (VR) is seen as an enactive and embodied technology, because its movement interfaces allow for interactive experiences. But one is still seen as 'disembodied' or only virtually embodied in the VR. The main feature of virtual engagements is not embodiment, but imagination, because imagination brings to mind unreal, fictional entities. What has not been thoroughly researched is the role of embodied/enactive imagination in VR. That is because this concept has not yet been fully developed. Also, the existing literature on VR sees imagination involved in VR as representational: virtual objects and environments, seen as fictions that do not exist, need to be represented in imagination. This creates a problem of how to explain immersing in the VR. This project brings the body into VR in a strong way. It defends a new ongoing embodied imagining (OEI) thesis for VR, which proposes that ongoing embodied processes (neural, motoric and explicit performances) allow us to anticipate future states or actions, also in virtual contexts. It sees virtual reality as a place of action possibilities available to an embodied being. This thesis is crucial for better understanding of virtual interactions. It can solve the problems to do with embodiment (is one truly embodied in the VR?) and immersion (can one be truly present in the VR?). This research will apply the OEI thesis in different contexts that utilize VR platforms, such as education, gaming, and sport.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Rucinska Zuzanna Aleksandra

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

In contemporary philosophy of mind, it now the rule rather than the exception to assert that cognition is not 'all in the head'. Although endorsed by many, the exact nature of the claim that cognitive processes — perceiving, imagining, remembering — are related to our bodies and world remains the topic of fierce debate. The interdisciplinary research tradition of enactivism takes perhaps the most radical line on this issue. According to enactivists, there is no real way to separate our thoughts, perceptions and actions from the places we are in. Cognition is not a process taking place inside an agent, bearing a relation to something outside of the agent, but an activity arising out of agent-world interactions. Brain, body and environment are said to play equal parts in structuring our experience; they form a 'coupled system' that is constantly updating itself via interactive adaptations, thus giving rise to how we act. Enactivism has proven popular among philosophers and cognitive scientists alike. But as of yet, it has said very little about the moral dimension of cognition. This research project aims to fill that gap. By drawing upon the tradition of American pragmatism, it attempts a systematic inquiry into the nature of moral agency in the enactivist framework. It specifically attempts to answer the question how moral action and knowledge should be seen if we accept that agency and the world in which we act are deeply interconnected.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Schaubroeck Katrien
• Co-promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Schoute David

Research team(s)

• Center for Ethics

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

Movement disorders related to perception and action, such as stroke, significantly impair functioning in daily living, severely impacting the life of affected individuals and having a huge economic impact. Although rehabilitation practice aims to restore functional ability through re-learning perception-action couplings, it leads to marginal improvements of daily functioning at best. Here it is argued that to improve effectiveness of rehabilitation a systems approach should be adopted to understand processes underlying perception-action disorders. A systems approach takes into account nonlinear interactions between components, enabling to explain for instance why patients do not respond stereotypical to rehabilitation training. REPAIRS (RE-learning Perception-Action In Rehabilitation from a Systems perspective) is a unique and timely training-through-research school, aiming to improve rehabilitation effectiveness. REPAIRS starts from systems-based fundamental knowledge on learning perception-action couplings to build applications to rehabilitation, while exploiting recent technology advancements. This research school provides the required critical mass of top-level researchers connecting European academic, clinical and technology experts to train the next generation of researchers and entrepreneurs in this perspective. REPAIRS studies interaction between four levels of the perception-action cycle: brain, muscles & joints, agent-environment and social, which is integrated with requirements on translation from clinical, technology and philosophical domains. The focus on interactions between levels and domains naturally ensures an interdisciplinary and intersectoral training. Integrating this with a high-level training of transferrable skills, dissemination and communication while exploiting an Experiential Skill Learning Workshop, will boost the employability of the young researchers involved and the innovation potential of Europe through reshaping rehabilitation.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

Within neuroscience, invoking information is standard practice. Moreover, many have now embraced the view of the brain as a prediction machine which updates its predictions in light of incoming information. Yet, these 'Predictive Processing' theories face big conceptual challenges. By relying on semantic notions like information, representation, prediction etc., they resist integration within the larger causal-mechanistic framework of which they claim to be a part. Yet, if we can't understand the neuroscientific data in terms of upstream information, downstream prediction and resulting prediction errors, how, then, should the neuroscientist interpret the bidirectional neural activity? First, the project will reinterpret the data which the Predictive Processing theorist frames in terms of prediction. The pivotal move here will be to substitute the notion of prediction with an empirically and experimentally underpinned notion of anticipation that does fit within the boundaries of the causal-mechanistic framework. Second, the research will investigate in what sense the data can be applied to two outstanding philosophical problems: the nature of information (information as relative to anticipation) and the mind-body problem (anticipation as a phenomenon cutting across the physical-mental distinction). This essentially interdisciplinary project, then, aspires a fruitful cross-fertilization between philosophy and (theoretical and experimental) neuroscience.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Zahnoun Farid

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The main goal of my sabbatical is to finish the manuscript for a book titled "Of a Different Mind". The book will be single-authored and is under contract with MIT Press. "Of a Different Mind" will provide an overall view of the philosophy of mind and psychology, but from a perspective that is quite different from the existing standard narrative. A secondary goal is to start working on articles deriving from the extensive systematic and historical research that I have undertaken and am undertaking for "Of a Different Mind".

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The main goal of my sabbatical is to finish the manuscript for a book titled "Of a Different Mind". The book will be single-authored and is under contract with MIT Press. "Of a Different Mind" will provide an overall view of the philosophy of mind and psychology, but from a perspective that is quite different from the existing standard narrative. A secondary goal is to start working on articles deriving from the extensive systematic and historical research that I have undertaken and am undertaking for "Of a Different Mind".

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

Texture as a distinct theoretical term appeared in musicians' discourse only towards the second part of the 20th century, and research of musical texture is in its early stage. A limited number of studies were published on this topic, and researchers differ in their approaches to analyzing musical texture. What most scholars do agree upon is that musical texture is a meta-parameter, that stem from the interrelations of all sonic events. In this research I examine the phenomenon of musical texture in regard to the research of visual texture, a distinct research field in cognitive science. Doing this I reexamine musical texture as a perceptual phenomenon, and present a theoretical model to analyze features in the music that contribute to the formation of musical texture. This model is continuously tested and refined through analyzing a wide variety of musical works, with an emphasis on contemporary music, where texture is especially evident On the artistic level of my research, I explore texture possibilities in music, through composing pieces and shorter musical fragments ('textural etudes') in which I use texture as a starting point of the creative process. The synergy between the artistic and theoretical aspects of the research is evident: I use composition as a testing field to explore issues I encounter in the theoretic research, and through a systematic study of texture I adopt new ways of expression and enrich my compositional language.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Gur Amit

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

Musicians move. Evidently. To produce sound, to show their musical intentions to other musicians, to communicate with an audience. But, can movement be used to develop musical skills? To develop improvisation skills? In this project, I will explore the natural connection between music and movement as the basis for developing improvisation skills and study how artistic growth in improvisation can be steered and shaped by exploiting this connection. The driving questions are: How can movement be artistically deployed? Can movement become a basis for developing creative improvisation skills and my own musical language? In the past 10 years, I have studied movement in the instrumental learning process from a theoretical, didactic and empirical perspective (see publications.lucnijs.be). However, increasingly I feel confronted with the need to also search for an answer to such questions through my own artistic practice. I am convinced that my artistic practice must become a fundament that underpins my current work and constitutes the basis for its further development. So, I want to unfold an artistic path that explores the integration of music and movement through an iterative process using free artistic exploration and a constraints-led approach based on different movement approaches (e.g. Laban, Gaga, Viewpoints, Dalcroze). I will investigate my own artistic growth, using a methodology that involves 3 tracks: (1) desk research, participation in movement workshops, conceptual design and elaboration of the theoretical framework on kinemusical performance, (2) empirical work in several movement-oriented phases, combining quantitative measurement of motor involvement (using neuronmocap sensors) and musical outcomes with a phenomenological investigation (think aloud procedure, video stimulated recall, diary) of my lived experience, (3) the artistic use of the motion capture data for 'augmented' multimodal performances, in which my improvisations emerge from the interactive loop between music, movement and visuals. The envisaged outcomes are: a series of kinemusical performances, several publications in international peer-reviewed journals, a written thesis, a series of video performances and a photo report, a publication for the educational implementation, software for multimodal performances, an analysis method for de movement data.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The theoretical environment in the philosophy of the cognitive sciences is diffuse. In explaining conscious perceptual experience we uphold a wide variety of different theories. Two popular promising theories about experience are predictive processing (PP) and sensorimotor theory (SMT). It seems that the respective theories have what the other lacks. Where PP's cerebral focus feels too narrow, SMT's bodily focus can seem to play down the importance of the neural underpinnings of experience. Despite this promising fit, SMT rejects the representations at work in PP, making them incompatible. In this research I intend to fuse PP and SMT, forming a hybrid theory. The challenge is to make the theory internally coherent. The field however is shrouded in vague terminology, and the aforementioned incompatibility may be as well. The concept 'representation' is famous for being indeterminate, and the first stage will involve clarification of terminology, as to sharpen the exact points of conflict. In stage 2, I intend to resolve this conflict, and open up the path for hybridity. This will be done by explaining PP's representational functions in terms of non-representational sensorimotor activity. In stage 3, I will assess the extent to which this hybrid theory is internally coherent without loss of explanatory reach or power. Or, if this project fails, I will analyze where the conflict is insurmountable, as to give a clear idea of how to proceed in explaining consciousness.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: van Es Thomas

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

When you see a lemon, you will be able to think you see a lemon. Moreover, when you see a shape you know to be a lemon, you might see it as more yellowish than an arbitrary shape. In other words, while what you perceive influences what you believe and know, what you know and believe also influences what you perceive. But exactly how does what you perceive influence what you believe and know? And exactly how do your beliefs and your knowledge influence what you perceive? In this project, it is investigated how such interface questions can be answered without assuming that the interaction between perception and thought is analogous in any way to meaningful communication. That is, interface questions are handled from the perspective of Pure Interaction views of perception, according to which perception is adaptive interaction of an organism with its environment, which happens without that perception "describes" either the environment or the interaction. It is investigated to what extent main interface effects can be explained in terms of attunement of an organism to the regularities in its environment, and of attention. It will be taken into account that attunement and attention are often sculpted by shared social practices. Finally, the project will seek whether attunement and attention can explain other processes in which knowledge influences such as in placebo effects or in psychotherapy.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

What is the mind? Notice that we talk about minds all the time. "Mind your head." "What did you have in mind?" "It slipped my mind." What do we mean? Many philosophers have thought that if the mind is anything, then it must be the brain. Others have argued that the mind is an external phenomenon. You desire that piece of cake, not just because some neurons are firing inside your brain, but because the cake is in front of you, it looks delicious, you can smell the frosting etc. Mental events then are not simply brain states. Rather, they consist in processes involving your body. But who is right? Internalists, who claim that the mind is an internal, brain-bound phenomenon? Or externalists, who insist that the mind is an external, interactive affair? In my project, I claim that both internalists and externalists are wrong. The mind is neither a state in your brain nor a process involving your body. I base this claim on the work of the philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was neither an internalist nor an externalist. He focused instead on behaviour, not in order to reduce the mind to behaviour, but rather because some of our psychological concepts, such as "thinking", are distinctive ways of characterizing our behaviours. I argue that this Wittgensteinian perspective offers a fresh take on how to understand the mind. For if Wittgenstein is right, then your mind is not locked away inside your head. Instead, your mind is revealed in the things you say and do.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Loughlin Victor

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

This research aims to explore the potential of Enactivism for explaining pretending. Pretending is part of a common development of children, and belongs to our cultural repertoire. Yet, pretending is still not well understood. Many are inclined to speak of pretending as representing 'x as y'. This is known as Cognitivism. It says that pretending requires representing absence, knowledge of what is real and not real, and knowledge of norms. To explain these features of pretending, Cognitivism relies mainly on the workings of internal mental architectures. These explanations do not capture well the interactive and social nature of pretending. In my proposal, I will investigate how an Enactivist approach explains pretending while avoiding the problems of Cognitivists. Enactivism includes interaction in its explanation of cognition, and often relies on dynamical explanations of cognition that stress the interplay between the brain, the body and the (social) environment. It proposes that knowledge of social norms is developed in pretend play, not assumed. Enactivism has only begun to be applied to basic forms of pretend playing with objects, but more needs to be said to account for absences or keeping track of fiction. This proposal will extend the earlier work, looking at development of role play and imaginary play, and aims to show that Enactivist account of complex pretending is possible. This research is useful for therapeutic practice that makes use of pretend play.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Rucinska Zuzanna Aleksandra

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The aim of this project is to develop a theory of fiction that accounts for the imaginative experience of interactive fictions such as videogames and virtual or augmented reality games. Peculiar to these kinds of fiction is that they are interactive, as their narrative development depends on the actions of the appreciator who is granted agency within the story through identification with a fictional character. Consequently, the experience of interactive fiction is often immersive in the sense that the appreciator feels present in the represented space. Existing fiction theories, such as Kendall Walton's make-believe theory and Peter Lamarque's thought theory, discuss traditional fictions like literature, theatre, and film. As such, these theories do not explain the fact that we can be moved to act towards fictional representations. Based on a critical examination of existing fiction theories, this project will develop a theory that accounts for the interaction with fictional objects.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Cools Arthur
• Co-promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Van de Mosselaer Nele

Research team(s)

• Center for European Philosophy

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

Texture as a distinct theoretical term appeared in musicians' discourse only towards the second part of the 20th century, and research of musical texture is in its early stage. A limited number of studies were published on this topic, and researchers differ in their approaches to analyzing musical texture. What most scholars do agree upon is that musical texture is a meta-parameter, that stem from the interrelations of all sonic events. In this research I examine the phenomenon of musical texture in regard to the research of visual texture, a distinct research field in cognitive science. Doing this I reexamine musical texture as a perceptual phenomenon, and present a theoretical model to analyze features in the music that contribute to the formation of musical texture. This model is continuously tested and refined through analyzing a wide variety of musical works, with an emphasis on contemporary music, where texture is especially evident On the artistic level of my research, I explore texture possibilities in music, through composing pieces and shorter musical fragments ('textural etudes') in which I use texture as a starting point of the creative process. The synergy between the artistic and theoretical aspects of the research is evident: I use composition as a testing field to explore issues I encounter in the theoretic research, and through a systematic study of texture I adopt new ways of expression and enrich my compositional language.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Gur Amit

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

Contemporary approaches to cognitive science consider perceiving as something we do, rather than as something that happens to us. Perception in these views does not instill a representation in our mind. But can we extend this non-representational approach to thinking as well? The aim of this project is to show what a non-representational account of thinking looks like from the combined perspective of ecological psychology and enactivism. To do this, first the ecological notion of "affordances" will be refined along enactivist lines, and second this notion will be applied to an analysis of thinking in scientific practices. This provides a proof in practice of the potential of an ecological-enactive approach to elucidate thinking. From this analysis of scientific practices moreover, it can be seen how an ecological-enactive approach implies a new sense of continuity between psychology and the practice of science.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: van Dijk Ludger

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The theoretical environment in the philosophy of the cognitive sciences is diffuse. In explaining conscious perceptual experience we uphold a wide variety of different theories. Two popular promising theories about experience are predictive processing (PP) and sensorimotor theory (SMT). It seems that the respective theories have what the other lacks. Where PP's cerebral focus feels too narrow, SMT's bodily focus can seem to play down the importance of the neural underpinnings of experience. Despite this promising fit, SMT rejects the representations at work in PP, making them incompatible. In this research I intend to fuse PP and SMT, forming a hybrid theory. The challenge is to make the theory internally coherent. The field however is shrouded in vague terminology, and the aforementioned incompatibility may be as well. The concept 'representation' is famous for being indeterminate, and the first stage will involve clarification of terminology, as to sharpen the exact points of conflict. In stage 2, I intend to resolve this conflict, and open up the path for hybridity. This will be done by explaining PP's representational functions in terms of non-representational sensorimotor activity. In stage 3, I will assess the extent to which this hybrid theory is internally coherent without loss of explanatory reach or power. Or, if this project fails, I will analyze where the conflict is insurmountable, as to give a clear idea of how to proceed in explaining consciousness.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: van Es Thomas

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The aim of this project is to examine contemporary theories of fiction and imagination with regard to the imaginative experience of interactive fictions such as videogames and virtual or augmented reality games, and to develop a comprehensive theory of fiction and imagination that is able to account for interactive fiction. Peculiar to interactive fiction is that the appreciator is also a participant in the story, as the narrative development depends on the actions of the appreciator who is granted agency within the story through identification with a fictional character. Consequently, the appreciator of interactive fiction feels present in the represented, fictional space. The existing, dominant fiction theories, such as Kendall Walton's make-believe theory and Peter Lamarque's thought theory, discuss traditional fictions like literature, theatre, and film. As such, these theories cannot explain the fact that we can be moved to act towards fictional representations. To analyse the strengths and problems of both fiction theories in explaining the imaginative experience of interactive fiction, they will be confronted with Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic approach of fiction. In his fiction theory, Ricoeur makes use of the concept of re-figuration and of a notion of practice to describe the experience of literary fiction. These two notions will be analysed and used to avoid the problems of Walton's make-believe theory and to investigate whether and how Lamarque's thought theory can be expanded to account for interactive fiction. A central aspect in Lamarque's theory of fiction is the opacity thesis, which states that the imaginative experience of a reader of literary fiction is determined by the way the fictional events are presented within the work of fiction. The hypothesis in this project will be that Lamarque's opacity thesis can be expanded and reinterpreted to contribute to the explanation of interactive fiction experiences. A study will thus be conducted on whether and how the new aspects of interactive fiction experiences – agency, immersion, and identification – are dependent on the specific mode of presentation of the interactive, fictional narrative. Furthermore, we will investigate whether and how the concept of imagination that is dominant within contemporary fiction theories should be modified. Generally speaking, these theories assume that fiction-induced imagination can cause (quasi-)emotions, but not actions. To show that fiction-induced imagination can motivate actions towards fictional objects, this project will draw from contemporary studies on imagination within the field of the philosophy of mind and confront these studies with the phenomenological approach of imagination in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre's approach, in which the constitutive contribution of the imagination to emotions and actions is analysed, might provide an interesting perspective to account for the connection between imagination, emotion, and action in the interactive fiction experience. Throughout these different steps, this project will gradually clarify and articulate the role of imagination in (interactive) fiction experiences. Lastly, the developed position will be evaluated by checking whether it is able to solve persistent problems within the philosophy of fiction (including the so-called paradox of fiction), and whether it is able to explain the phenomenological experience of interactive fiction.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Cools Arthur
• Co-promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Arienti Marco

Research team(s)

• Center for European Philosophy

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The aim of this project is to develop a theory of fiction that accounts for the imaginative experience of interactive fictions such as videogames and virtual or augmented reality games. Peculiar to these kinds of fiction is that they are interactive, as their narrative development depends on the actions of the appreciator who is granted agency within the story through identification with a fictional character. Consequently, the experience of interactive fiction is often immersive in the sense that the appreciator feels present in the represented space. Existing fiction theories, such as Kendall Walton's make-believe theory and Peter Lamarque's thought theory, discuss traditional fictions like literature, theatre, and film. As such, these theories do not explain the fact that we can be moved to act towards fictional representations. Based on a critical examination of existing fiction theories, this project will develop a theory that accounts for the interaction with fictional objects.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Cools Arthur
• Co-promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Van de Mosselaer Nele

Research team(s)

• Center for European Philosophy

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The aim of the scientific research community Logical & Methodological Analysis of Scientific Reasoning Processes is to coordinate and stimulate research on two themes: - Logical analysis of scientific reasoning processes. - Methodological and epistemological analysis of scientific reasoning processes. Examples of specific topics that fit into the first theme are: logical analyses of paraconsistent reasoning, reasoning under uncertainty, defeasible reasoning, abduction, causal reasoning, induction, analogical reasoning, belief revision, reasoning about action and norms, erotetic reasoning (i.e. reasoning about questions), argumentation. Examples of specific topics that fit into the second theme are: methodological and epistemological analyses of causation and mechanisms, scientific explanation, scientific discovery, the structure of scientific theories and models, experiments and thought experiments, theory choice, theory dynamics, conceptual change, scientific expertise.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Co-promoter: Leuridan Bert

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

In this project, we will continue and broaden our artistic, scientific, and philosophical approach to investigating peripheral vision, i.e., visual perception outside the centre of gaze. We will create an entirely new image type - images that can be recognized in the periphery but not in central vision, and explore the results, as well as our previous findings from the point of view of each discipline. We will increase our public outreach, present at universities and exhibit in galleries and museums.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

What is the mind? Notice that we talk about minds all the time. "Mind your head." "What did you have in mind?" "It slipped my mind." What do we mean? Many philosophers have thought that if the mind is anything, then it must be the brain. Others have argued that the mind is an external phenomenon. You desire that piece of cake, not just because some neurons are firing inside your brain, but because the cake is in front of you, it looks delicious, you can smell the frosting etc. Mental events then are not simply brain states. Rather, they consist in processes involving your body. But who is right? Internalists, who claim that the mind is an internal, brain-bound phenomenon? Or externalists, who insist that the mind is an external, interactive affair? In my project, I claim that both internalists and externalists are wrong. The mind is neither a state in your brain nor a process involving your body. I base this claim on the work of the philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was neither an internalist nor an externalist. He focused instead on behaviour, not in order to reduce the mind to behaviour, but rather because some of our psychological concepts, such as "thinking", are distinctive ways of characterizing our behaviours. I argue that this Wittgensteinian perspective offers a fresh take on how to understand the mind. For if Wittgenstein is right, then your mind is not locked away inside your head. Instead, your mind is revealed in the things you say and do.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Loughlin Victor

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project website

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The aim of this research project is to extend the Enactivist approach by showing how symbolic activities, in particular language and mathematics, can arise from embodied active engagement with the social environment, which currently presents the greatest challenge to EEC.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

When a person stretches out her hand to me, I see it as an invitation to shake her hand. In other words, I see her hand as 'shake-able'. J.J. Gibson invented a word for this phenomenon. He called it an 'affordance'. The out-stretched hand 'affords' me to shake it. Likewise, a ball flying towards me 'affords' me to catch it, if I have the right kind of skills. It has the affordance 'catch-ability'. What, now, makes it the case that I see features of situations as 'Q-able'. Clearly, not only the physical properties of the situation or object matter. Characteristics of the perceiver are involved as well, cf. my ball catching skills. A person who's never played a ball game may not see a fast flying ball as catchable. How should this mode of perception be construed? Does the perceiver 'infer' the affordance from assembled information about himself and the situation? Or is the affordance perceived 'directly', without an inferential process? Gibson endorsed the latter, but his theory doesn't provide a clear story of how direct perception of affordances should be understood. The concept of affordance is attractive for applications in many domains such as social and moral perception, but has also received a lot of criticism for its vagueness and the uncertainty of its explanatory role. This project aims at elucidating what it means to perceive affordances in their wide – physical, social and moral – application, and at providing a solid basis for their explanatory role.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Co-promoter: Lemmens Willem
• Fellow: Van Eemeren Jan

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

According to standard wisdom in both philosophy and the sciences of cognition, capacities such as imagination, memory and thinking always and invariably require representations. To imagine, remember or think is to relate to what is not present or online, and therefore needs to be represented. The object of this project is to inquire whether and how this accepted view on offline capacities can be rethought from the perspective called "radical enactive cognition".

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

I will propose an 'existence proof' of a theory of radical embodied moral emotions, keeping the virtues of Prinz' account of the role of emotions in morality, but without relying on 'mentalistic' concepts.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Co-promoter: Lemmens Willem
• Fellow: Van Eemeren Jan

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The goal of this project is to reconsider the notion of computation, especially in its received interpretation as fundamentally inner. It will be proposed that computation should be construed primarily as referring to external, or world-involving, person-bound activity. This notion of overt computation will be developed, and its explanatory potential will be investigated. The notion of inner computation, as allegedly carried out inside the brain, will be questioned.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

This is a fundamental research project financed by the Research Foundation - Flanders (FWO). The project was subsidized after selection by the FWO-expert panel.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The electronic mass media, omnipresent in our contemporary world, are characterized by transparency. They disappear, to make something else appear, for instance a football match or the artificial environment of a game. This project tries to describe these mediated (or virtual) realities phenomenologically, thereby trying to gain new insight into the relation between virtual and non-virtual reality.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Van Eekert Geert
• Co-promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Gooskens Geert

Research team(s)

• Center for European Philosophy

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

My project will examine the link between Enactivism and the idea that consciousness is an extended environmental process. Enactivism is a distinctive contemporary philosophical approach in which it is held that what we experience when perceiving and how we experience when perceiving is determined by what we do. By forging determinative links between action and the quality of experience Enactivism opposes itself to the widely accepted position according to which phenomenal character is ascribed to perceptual states, independent of how those states are embedded in action. Moreover, as action takes place in an environment, Enactivism leads to extended conscious mind (ECM). ECM is the thesis that consciousness extends into the environment. Consciousness then is not a property of brain states or processes, independent of their relation to bodies and environments. Consciousness is an activity of the situated organism. Such a view of consciousness suggests fresh approaches to traditional problems in philosophy of mind. My project will attempt to assess how well Enactivism supports extended conscious mind (ECM).

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: Loughlin Victor

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

In this project, a theory of imagery will be defended which conceives it as a form of perceptual activity. Grounded on the so-called 'enactive' approach to perception, which conceives of perception as an active exploration of the environment, the idea will be developed that imagery is a process of 're-enactment', with which no internal images or representations are being generated in the head.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

Perception has an objective and a subjective aspect. We perceive events and objects, but at the same time these appear to us in a certain manner. An important role in the determination of 'how objects appear to us' is played by the sensory modalities. Philosophers from Aristotle to Paul Grice have considered the question what precisely distinguishes the senses: What makes hearing into hearing, and seeing into seeing? But also the question of what connects the sensory modalities has strongly attracted the philosophical attention. This is what is at issue in the famous Molyneux Question: What would happen if a blind person, capable of tactile recognition of a sphere or a cube, suddenly gained the capacity of sight? Would he be able to distinguish by looking the sphere from the cube? In the proposed project the two questions regarding what distinguishes and connects the senses will be reconsidered from the combined perspective of the sensorimotor contingency theory for perception and perceptual awareness and of the ideas of Andy Clark about the 'Extended Mind' and his hypothesis that humans are Natural-Born Cyborgs: Creatures which integrate external tools into their behaviour in such a way that these become literally part of themselves. On the basis of the conception of the senses constructed from this perspective, an account will be given of what distinguishes and connects the senses, and it will be investigated how this conception allows for relieving the tension between how objects appear to us, and how they are. The proposed theory of the senses has important implications regarding the debate between internalists and externalists about whether the mind is 'in the head', or extends into the environment.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The goal of this project is to finish the manuscript for a book, under contract with MIT Press, Titled ''Enactivism Explicated. Consciousness Clarified', written by Dan Hutto (University of Hertfordshire) and Erik Myin. In the book a particular, radically noncognitivist, enactive approach to awareness will be elaborated and defended.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The electronic mass media, omnipresent in our contemporary world, are characterized by transparency. They disappear, to make something else appear, for instance a football match or the artificial environment of a game. This project tries to describe these mediated (or virtual) realities phenomenologically, thereby trying to gain new insight into the relation between virtual and non-virtual reality.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: De Graeve Peter
• Promoter: Van Eekert Geert
• Co-promoter: Myin Erik
• Co-promoter: Van Eekert Geert
• Fellow: Gooskens Geert

Research team(s)

• Center for European Philosophy

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The project is submitted in order to obtain support for the joint writing of a book titled 'Consciousness Clarified', by the promotor and Dan Hutto. In the book a novel position with respect to the relation between the mental and the physical will be elaborated. It will be shown that the position can be fruitfully applied to both philosophy and the sciences, as they wrestle to get a grip on the relation between experience and objective scientific data.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

This project is aimed at the exploration of the philosophical implications of the sensorimotor contingency theory about percetion and perceptual awareness. Three domains that will be focused on are: colour, space and sensory substitution.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The proposed project will study the topic of pictorial representation as a part of the larger inquiry into the nature of visual consciousness. The main aim is to reconsider pictorial representation in the light of recent advances in our understanding of visual perception. Drawing upon the available theories, it will be examined what an adequate theory of depiction should look like. It will be argued that none of the current proposals succeed in adequately explaining depiction, and that this is mainly due to some major misunderstandings about the nature and phenomenology of visual perception quite generally. Some deeply entrenched but erroneous conceptions of both pictures and visual perception are intimately related, so it will be argued. Unravelling this relationship might be illuminating for a better understanding of the nature of pictorial representation as well as the phenomenology of perception. An alternative model of pictorial representation will be proposed, inspired by an enactive approach to visual experience.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Co-promoter: Leilich Joachim

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The goal is to further develop, in breath and depth, the sensorimotor approach to perception and consciousness. Specifically the phenomenon of sensory substitution will be investigated. Sensory substitution refers to the substitution of one sensory modality for another, for example hearing for seeing. Results obtained from studying sensory substitution have important philosophical implications, among others concerning the role of the 'body-scheme'.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The aim is to further explore the philosophical consequences of the so called 'sensorimotor contingency theory' of perception and perceptual experience. Besides further elaborating it as a theory of consciousness, the goal is to draw further philosophical conclusions from recent developments within the theory on color and space. This should lead to an externalist account of color and space, which goes substantially beyond existing philosophical theories which share the recognition of the active and external nature of perception and cognition.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project