Research Judith Martens

Abstract

When can we speak of an action? And when is it rather that something happens to you? In philosophy, there has long been the distinction between mere bodily movement and intentional action. This distinction is important for, among other things, the way we think about autonomy and responsibility. It is also strongly linked to the idea of reason-responsiveness, whether an agent adequately responds to reasons for or against certain decisions. Habits and skills can be placed, on the one hand, in the category of action, but also in the category of merely bodily movement. This is because they can be categorized as both purposeful and automatic. In response, an intermediate category has been proposed, allowing us to distinguish between mere bodily movements; activities (or doings); and intentional actions. However, this solution runs into quite a few problems. The goal of this project is to better understand this intermediate category and its relationship to the other categories. This is done through a deep study of habits and skills. For this we will use pragmatism and situated philosophical of mind. In addition, cognitive science is examined. This includes a focus on the different forms of control as well as metacognitive processes. Both of these components are integrated into a model of highly meshed cognition (cognition as non-hierarchically organized and highly integrated). Through this study, a new model of action is proposed that is more in line with current findings in the cognitive sciences. This will give us new tools to think about autonomy and responsibility, for example within the discussion of implicit cognition and implicit biases.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Martens Judith
• Fellow: Esseling Michiel

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

A standard view on group obligations holds that such obligations are simply collective properties in disguise, i.e. if they hold of a group of agents, it doesn't follow that they also hold of each member of that group. However, I will argue that this standard view is problematic for both empirical and theoretical reasons: group obligations are not just collective properties, conditions occurring in the standard definition are not jointly necessary, and, moreover, they encounter more or less formal objections w.r.t the deontic nature of obligations. I propose a research project at the interface of Philosophical Logic and Moral Philosophy that will address these issues. The central hypothesis that I will support throughout my project is that a closer look at the mereological properties of groups will lead to a proper understanding of these group obligations. My project will have three main original contributions. Its first contribution will be a class of concepts for group obligations. Its second contribution will be a study of the connection between mereological and normative concepts. Its third contribution will be the definition of a higher-order deontic logic for group obligations. My project will successfully address the issues encountered by the current standard definition of group obligations and will provide new insights on group obligations that will be useful both to logicians and moral philosophers.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Martens Judith
• Fellow: Flament Miguel

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project