Research team
The impact of government regulation and self-monitoring in capital markets;
Abstract
Good investor protection is of primordial importance to ensure that investors are willing to invest in a company. This is important during the entire life of a firm and especially when the firms needs external funding, e.g. at incorporation or when going public. At incorporation, the legal requirements for firm entry guarantee a minimal level of investor protection. When firms go public, they should comply with the listing rules, which further improve shareholder protection. Moreover, firms can also voluntarily adopt additional protection mechanisms. During the life of a firm, protection against managerial misbehavior is ensured by, e.g., giving shareholders voting rights on the annual meeting. All over the world, laws on the entry of new firms, listing rules and voting rules, which are thus designed to guarantee investor protection, are currently under debate (e.g. debate on strict listing rules in China). As regulators today face similar problems as regulators in the past, I use history as a laboratory to investigate the impact of regulation. I go back to pre-World War II Belgium, which was at that time one of the leading economies in the world. I first examine the effect of the abolition of government permission to incorporate new firms (1873) and to go public (1867) (1). Next, I study the effect of the abolition of multiple voting shares (1934) (2). Finally, I investigate the voluntary adoption of protection mechanisms when legal investor protection was weak (3).Researcher(s)
- Promoter: Paeleman Ine
- Fellow: Moortgat Leentje
Research team(s)
Project type(s)
- Research Project
Dividend policy: a long term investigation.
Abstract
In this project, I will describe the dividend policy of Belgian firms during the period 1832-2012. I will focus on firms listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange during this period. Data is available from the SCOB-database. In a first part, I investigate the evolution of dividend policy over the period 1832-2012, which was characterized by major institutional, regulatory and tax changes, such as the introduction of taxes on dividends, the abolishment of multiple voting shares, the split-up of universal banks etc. My long-term perspective allows investigating how such changes affect dividend policy. Next, I investigate the evolution of cross-sectional determinants of dividend policy.Researcher(s)
- Promoter: Deloof Marc
- Co-promoter: Annaert Jan
- Fellow: Moortgat Leentje
Research team(s)
Project type(s)
- Research Project
Dividend policy: a long term investigation.
Abstract
In this project, I will describe the dividend policy of Belgian firms during the period 1832-2012. I will focus on firms listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange during this period. Data is available from the SCOB-database. In a first part, I investigate the evolution of dividend policy over the period 1832-2012, which was characterized by major institutional, regulatory and tax changes, such as the introduction of taxes on dividends, the abolishment of multiple voting shares, the split-up of universal banks etc. My long-term perspective allows investigating how such changes affect dividend policy. Next, I investigate the evolution of cross-sectional determinants of dividend policy.Researcher(s)
- Promoter: Deloof Marc
- Co-promoter: Annaert Jan
- Fellow: Moortgat Leentje
Research team(s)
Project type(s)
- Research Project