Research team
Expertise
This research aims to explore the potential of Enactivism for explaining pretending. Pretending is part of a common development of children, and belongs to our cultural repertoire. Yet, pretending is still not well understood. Many are inclined to speak of pretending as representing 'x as y'. This is known as Cognitivism. It says that pretending requires representing absence, knowledge of what is real and not real, and knowledge of norms. To explain these features of pretending, Cognitivism relies mainly on the workings of internal mental architectures. These explanations do not capture well the interactive and social nature of pretending. In my proposal, I will investigate how an Enactivist approach explains pretending while avoiding the problems of Cognitivists. Enactivism includes interaction in its explanation of cognition, and often relies on dynamical explanations of cognition that stress the interplay between the brain, the body and the (social) environment. It proposes that knowledge of social norms is developed in pretend play, not assumed. Enactivism has only begun to be applied to basic forms of pretend playing with objects, but more needs to be said to account for absences or keeping track of fiction. This proposal will extend the earlier work, looking at development of role play and imaginary play, and aims to show that Enactivist account of complex pretending is possible. This research is useful for therapeutic practice that makes use of pretend play.
Understanding virtual reality through ongoing embodied imagining.
Abstract
Virtual Reality (VR) is seen as an enactive and embodied technology, because its movement interfaces allow for interactive experiences. But one is still seen as 'disembodied' or only virtually embodied in the VR. The main feature of virtual engagements is not embodiment, but imagination, because imagination brings to mind unreal, fictional entities. What has not been thoroughly researched is the role of embodied/enactive imagination in VR. That is because this concept has not yet been fully developed. Also, the existing literature on VR sees imagination involved in VR as representational: virtual objects and environments, seen as fictions that do not exist, need to be represented in imagination. This creates a problem of how to explain immersing in the VR. This project brings the body into VR in a strong way. It defends a new ongoing embodied imagining (OEI) thesis for VR, which proposes that ongoing embodied processes (neural, motoric and explicit performances) allow us to anticipate future states or actions, also in virtual contexts. It sees virtual reality as a place of action possibilities available to an embodied being. This thesis is crucial for better understanding of virtual interactions. It can solve the problems to do with embodiment (is one truly embodied in the VR?) and immersion (can one be truly present in the VR?). This research will apply the OEI thesis in different contexts that utilize VR platforms, such as education, gaming, and sport.Researcher(s)
- Promoter: Myin Erik
- Fellow: Rucinska Zuzanna Aleksandra
Research team(s)
Project type(s)
- Research Project
Enactive Approach to Pretending.
Abstract
This research aims to explore the potential of Enactivism for explaining pretending. Pretending is part of a common development of children, and belongs to our cultural repertoire. Yet, pretending is still not well understood. Many are inclined to speak of pretending as representing 'x as y'. This is known as Cognitivism. It says that pretending requires representing absence, knowledge of what is real and not real, and knowledge of norms. To explain these features of pretending, Cognitivism relies mainly on the workings of internal mental architectures. These explanations do not capture well the interactive and social nature of pretending. In my proposal, I will investigate how an Enactivist approach explains pretending while avoiding the problems of Cognitivists. Enactivism includes interaction in its explanation of cognition, and often relies on dynamical explanations of cognition that stress the interplay between the brain, the body and the (social) environment. It proposes that knowledge of social norms is developed in pretend play, not assumed. Enactivism has only begun to be applied to basic forms of pretend playing with objects, but more needs to be said to account for absences or keeping track of fiction. This proposal will extend the earlier work, looking at development of role play and imaginary play, and aims to show that Enactivist account of complex pretending is possible. This research is useful for therapeutic practice that makes use of pretend play.Researcher(s)
- Promoter: Myin Erik
- Fellow: Rucinska Zuzanna Aleksandra
Research team(s)
Project type(s)
- Research Project